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ABSTRACT 
This thesis evaluates the U.S. government policies that 
mandate the DoD launch government payloads only from 
vehicles produced domestically as a means to protect 
America’s national security interests.  Unfortunately, over 
the past decade, the commercial space launch industry has 
suffered several programmatic and economic setbacks, 
culminating in the DoD being forced to financially maintain 
the commercial space launch industry.  The result is a 
quasi—government-run program, plagued by overruns and 
consuming a preponderance of the DoD’s appropriated space-
systems budget.   
How can the DoD afford to continue with its current 
strategy, given the realities within the industry?  The 
evaluation of this question requires a better understanding 
of three issues: challenges within the domestic space launch 
industry; an analysis of domestic and foreign launch 
systems; and a review of outside contributing factors.  It 
is apparent that the DoD’s efforts to subsidize the industry 
are viewed as being essential, based on current policies.  
However, this strategy may, in fact, be weakening the U.S. 
space launch industry and creating a single point of failure 
that could jeopardize the DoD’s ability to access space. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis examines the United States government’s 
policies and practices of only contracting with domestic 
corporations to meet the Department of Defense’s (DoD) 
access to space requirements.  A result of these policies is 
the prohibition of potential space launch service providers 
who may be able to meet the DoD’s requirements in a manner 
that is timelier, more affordable, and just as reliable as 
their U.S. counterparts.  However, these attributes to date 
have not overcome certain national security concerns about 
foreign corporations and states having access to potentially 
sensitive information.  As such, the DoD must find a balance 
where it can reap the potential benefits inherent within 
international collaboration, while bolstering the nation’s 
security.   
The evaluation of this issue is broken down into three 
key areas, which provide the necessary information and tools 
to help answer the question posed in this thesis.  First, 
the thesis begins by examining current U.S. space launch 
policies that are mandating the DoD’s use of domestic space 
launch suppliers and establishes an understanding of exactly 
what the government is paying to achieve and maintain access 
to space.  The next section will present an overview and 
comparison of the reliability, capability, and cost of 
foreign space launch systems in relation to their American 
EELV counterpart.  The thesis concludes by examining other  
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contributing factors that, while not directly affecting the 
DoD’s current strategy, play a critical role in the 
establishment of the access to space policies.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
The use of space and space-related technologies has 
become an integral cornerstone of our society. Any 
diminished capability would affect our ability to exploit 
space for commercial, civil, and military means.  The DoD 
has come to rely on space-based technologies as a force 
multiplier, providing the capability for real-time 
communications, providing weather forecasts to units in the 
field, and collecting intelligence information vital to 
America’s national security at home and abroad.  A 
disruption or degradation in the DoD’s ability to exploit 
space would ultimately affect how we go about defending our 
homeland.  Furthermore, since the DoD does not appear to be 
relaxing its reliance on space and space-based assets, we 
need to ensure that we are using the most efficient and 
effective means of maintaining our access to space.  
This task will be a departure from the way the in which 
the DoD has historically approached the U.S. space mission.  
The United States will have to rely more on international 
support, rather than on the traditional government-driven 
domestic aerospace industry, to access, control, and exploit 
space as a medium to meet the needs of our nation.  
President Barack Obama’s speech to the nation, on April 15, 
2010, made this fact crystal clear. The President pointed 
out that as a nation we cannot continue on the path we have 
traveled over the past fifty years if we are to succeed in 
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the future.1  This new reality has since permeated down to 
the DoD; the U.S. assistant secretary of defense for global 
strategic affairs, Michael Nacht, discussed the critical 
need to evolve our DoD space policies to match a growing 
reliance on international cooperation.  This will 
undoubtedly affect many of our national security policies 
concerning preserving and maintaining the DoD’s access to 
space.2 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The basic question this thesis addresses is whether the 
DoD can afford to continue and maintain its current strategy 
for assuring its access to space.  The problem arises in 
attempting to determine the true motivation behind the 
current strategy, and the concerns that are preventing the 
government from allowing the DoD to utilize foreign 
suppliers as part of its space launch strategy.  This 
strategy can become more efficient if the DoD were to 
incorporate international cooperation as it seeks to 
maintain the department’s access to space rather than rely 
solely on the services of one American corporation.   
The quandary that this problem highlights is how the 
DoD should go about achieving the proper balance between a 
strong defense industrial base and a reasonable and 
realistic fiscal approach toward space launch.  There are 
proponents, both in the government and academic fields, who 
argue that the answer to this dilemma lies in the continued 
                     
1 Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President on Space Exploration in the 
21st Century" (speech, John F. Kennedy Space Center, Merritt Island, FL, 
April 15, 2010). 
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support and funding of the space launch industry as it 
exists today.3  These supporters stress that it is vital to 
maintain and expand the “intellectual capital” and 
technological innovations that can be harvested by the DoD’s 
continued support of the aerospace industry.4  However, a 
growing number of people believe that the answer lies not in 
maintaining the status quo, but rather in expanding the 
means by which we can achieve our goal of assured access to 
space through more collaboration and competition.  This idea 
is not new or revolutionary.  The National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) has come to rely on 
international collaboration to achieve its mission, most 
recently with the construction and operation of the 
International Space Station.  What will be new is the idea 
of making this the norm, not the exception, for the DoD. 
It is the author’s hypothesis that the DoD can in fact 
access space more efficiently with more international 
collaboration, while also addressing the concerns it has 
regarding protecting our national security.   
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The debate on whether to continue to use domestic space 
launch providers, rather than broaden the spectrum of 
potential suppliers, is one that has been ongoing for 
several years.  However, there is a discrepancy in the logic 
                     
2 Turner Brinton, “International Cooperation Emphasis of Forthcoming 
U.S. Space Policy,” Space News, May 21, 2010. 
3 Scott Pace, "Challenges to US Space Sustainability," Space Policy 
25, no. 3 (August 2009), 158; Philip K. Lawrence, Aerospace Strategic 
Trade: How the U.S. Subsidizes the Large Commercial Aircraft Industry 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2001), 86–112. 
4 Pace, "Challenges to US Space Sustainability," 158. 
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regarding the need to maintain a domestic space launch 
capability, with the fact that it is already being 
subsidized and directed almost exclusively by the DoD.  Many 
will argue that this position is shortsighted and even 
harmful to the domestic space launch industry.5  Such 
government policies and practices ignore the economic fact 
that consumers, including the DoD, should seek out and use 
suppliers who offers these services in the most effective 
manner and at the lowest price, whether from foreign or 
domestic space launch providers, as long as there are no 
security concerns with doing so. 
This notion, however, is offset by the belief that the 
space launch industry is of vital national interest and, as 
such, it needs to be protected and preserved by the federal 
government.  The Bush administration’s 2006 U.S. National 
Space Policy clearly states that one of the goals of the 
administration, with regard to maintaining our access to 
space, was to “preserve its rights, capabilities, and 
freedom of action in space” and to “dissuade or deter others 
from impeding those rights.”6  This policy has been 
criticized as promoting a “go it alone” strategy, while 
ignoring the value to be gained through international 
cooperation and partnership.  Then, in June of 2010, the 
Obama administration issued a revised National Space Policy 
whose primary goals were to “energize competitive domestic 
                     
5 The United States Air Force is recognized as the lead agency for 
maintaining and launching the Department of Defense’s space systems.  As 
such, it has become the Department of Defense’s space launch contracting 
authority as well; Executive Office of the President, National Science 
and Technology Council, U.S. National Space Policy (Washington, D.C.: 
Office of Science and Technology Policy, 2006), 1–2. 
6 Executive Office of the President, U.S. National Space Policy, 1–2. 
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industries” and to “expand international cooperation.”7  
Yet, this policy sidesteps these goals when it comes to 
assured access to space, mandating that all government and 
DoD satellites shall be launched from domestic providers in 
an effort to enhance the nation’s capabilities to access 
space.8  This inconsistency highlights the disjointed nature 
of the 2010 policy in trying to guide the use of space to 
meet the goals set forth in the document. 
The issue, therefore, is whether the 2006 or 2010 U.S. 
Space Policies are relevant in today’s environment.  The 
National Space Forum in 2008 met to examine key policy 
decisions that need to be addressed by the new Obama 
administration.  The forum focused on the stability of the 
U.S. civil space sector, considering all the budgetary and 
resource challenges facing the administration.9  One of the 
most pertinent issues examined was whether the current set 
of export control laws and regulations are doing America’s 
national security and economic interests more harm than 
good.  Specifically, the continued use of inefficient and 
outdated policies, such as the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR), not only hinders the DoD’s 
effectiveness, but complicates military alliances as well.10  
Ultimately, the level of regulation imposed must balance the  
 
 
                     
7 Executive Office of the President, U.S. National Space Policy, 4. 
8 Executive Office of the President, U.S. National Space Policy, 5. 
9 Eligar Sadeh, "Space Policy Challenges Facing the Barack Obama 
Administration," Space Policy 25, no. 2 (May 2009), 109–116. 
10 Robert Gates, "Remarks by the Secretary of Defense on Export-
Control Reform” (Speech, Business Executives for National Security, 
Washington, D.C., April 20, 2010). 
  7
goals of protecting America’s national security with 
maintaining a competitive market base from which the United 
States can benefit economically.11 
American policies and practices are consistent in their 
message: We must protect the American defense industrial 
base if the United States is to remain a relevant space 
power.  Unfortunately, policymakers continue to struggle 
with how to develop an efficient and effective set of 
policies to accomplish that aim, while also protecting this 
key component of our national security and homeland defense.  
Therein lies the gap between how the DoD is meeting its 
access to space requirements and what truly is best for the 
nation.  The confusion from policy to practice is 
understandable; the guiding space policy effectually creates 
this confusion.  While the U.S National Space Policy 
presents a firm and authoritative perspective on how the 
United States plans to execute its national policy, it also 
offers a contradictory view as to how we should go about 
achieving that goal. Specifically, the policy directs the 
Secretary of Defense to provide “reliable, affordable, and 
timely access to space,” and endeavor to use cost-effective 
U.S. commercial firms, but also allows the use of foreign 
commercial services if available and required.12  The most 
perplexing contradiction lies in the guidance regarding 
international space cooperation.  With the cited goal of 
enhancing international cooperation, the government should 
“augment U.S. capabilities by leveraging existing and 
planned space capabilities of allies and space partners,” 
                     
11 Gates, "Remarks by the Secretary of Defense,” 111–112. 
12 Executive Office of the President, U.S. National Space Policy, 
2010, 14. 
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but then prohibiting foreign systems to be used as part of 
the DoD’s assured access to space strategy.13  
Scott Pace, the current director of George Washington 
University’s Space Policy Institute, argues that the United 
States should not restrict the DoD to using only the 
American aerospace giants to meet its space launch 
requirements.  Believing that the space launch industry is, 
in fact, facing an “underlying erosion of the space 
industrial base which has further exacerbated the problems 
of cost growth and weak innovation,” leading many to believe 
that the United States should seek to use more commercial 
and international capabilities to meet our nation’s growing 
requirements.14  The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 
noted in its 2009 Space and U.S. Security Assessment that 
one of the largest gaps in U.S. space capabilities lies in 
the basic ability to deliver effective and cost-efficient 
systems, as compared to other international countries and 
their domestic corporations and/or consortiums.15  This 
difference leads one to assume that the driving force behind 
the market-share differential within the commercial launch 
industry is the ability of foreign corporations to provide 
comparable space launch capabilities at a lower cost.  
The debate over this issue is not restricted to 
academics and civilian institutions.  Over the past few 
years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has issued 
                     
13 Executive Office of the President, U.S. National Space Policy, 
2010, 7. 
14 Pace, "Challenges to US Space Sustainability," 156–159. 
15 Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., Space and U.S. Security: A Net 
Assessment (Cambridge, MA: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 
Inc., 2009), 13–16. 
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numerous studies regarding issues of the sustainability, 
affordability, and efficiency of America’s space launch 
capabilities.16  The GAO cited numerous uncertainties in the 
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program’s ability 
to meet the program’s cost, schedule, and technical 
milestones.17  Specifically, the Air Force’s use of program 
cost estimates, which explicitly assumed a robust commercial 
market would offset the government’s cost burden, was an 
inaccurate assumption.18  Regrettably, the DoD is unable to 
quantify exactly how large this burden will become.  This 
trend will continue to rise, due in large part to the 
diminishing commercial satellite market and the cancellation 
                     
16 Christina Chaplain, Space Acquisitions: Government and Industry 
Partners Face Substantial Challenges in Developing New DOD Space Systems 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2009); Cristina 
Chaplain et al., Space Acquisitions: DOD is Making Progress to Rapidly 
Deliver Low Cost Space Capabilities, but Challenges Remain (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2008); Government Accountability 
Office, Space Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable 
Launch Vehicle Program Pose Management and Oversight Challenges 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2008); Government 
Accountability Office, Space Acquisitions: DoD Needs a Department wide 
Strategy for Pursuing Low-Cost, Responsive Tactical Space Capabilities 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2006). 
17 The Department of Defense and U.S. Air Force launched the Evolved 
Expendable Launch Vehicle program in 1995 as America’s next generation 
of space launch vehicles, hoping to capitalize on an efficient and new 
generation of vehicles developed by Lockheed Martin and the Boeing 
Corporation (Government Accountability Office 2008, Space Acquisitions: 
Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program Pose 
Management and Oversight Challenges, 4). 
18 Government Accountability Office, Space Acquisitions: 
Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program Pose 
Management and Oversight Challenges, 1–4. 
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of NASA’s Constellation program, which are driving up the 
sustainment and procurement costs levied upon the DoD.19 
Unfortunately, the Department of Defense and Air Force 
acquisition policies and program offices are also 
inefficient and undermanned, decreasing the likelihood that 
the sweeping reforms required to meet the DoD’s EELV 
forecasts can ever be achieved.20  Many proponents have 
speculated that the most cost efficient and technically 
effective manner for the DoD to preserve its access to space 
is to begin planning to supplement the once purely 
government-backed launch programs with contributions from 
international partnerships, much in the same manner as its 
civil counterpart NASA has done with the International Space 
Station.21 
E. METHOD AND OVERVIEW 
The next chapter of the thesis takes an analytical 
approach to examine the current state of the DoD’s assured 
access to space program.  It examines the policies and 
regulations guiding the actions of the DoD, as well as 
presents an overview of the challenges inherent within the 
strategy and program that are giving rise to uncontrollable 
                     
19 Henry R. Hertzfeld and Nicolas Peter, "Developing New Launch 
Vehicle Technology: The Case for Multi-National Private Sector 
Cooperation," Space Policy 23, no. 2 (May 2007), 81; Doug Messier, “Air 
Force Wrestles with EELV Launch Costs as NASA Weights Options,” 
Parabolic Arc, April 1, 2010; Todd Harrison, Looking Ahead to the FY 
2011 Defense Budget: A Review of the Past Decade and Implications for 
the Future Year Defense Program (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic 
and Budgetary Assessments, 2010), 15–17. 
20 Chaplain, Space Acquisitions: Government and Industry Partners 
Face Substantial Challenges in Developing New DOD Space Systems, 16. 
21 Henry R. Hertzfeld and Nicolas Peter, "Developing New Launch 
Vehicle Technology: The Case for Multi-National Private Sector 
Cooperation," 81–89. 
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costs.  Chapter III presents an analysis of the alternate 
means by which the DoD could fulfill its access to space 
requirements.  It presents an overview of the current 
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program alongside 
three other comparable launch systems, focusing on the 
reliability, capability, and costs of each system.  This 
analysis helps in creating an effectiveness comparison 
between each system, highlighting any technical or 
programmatic reasons that may be restricting the DoD from 
using a foreign service provider.  Chapter IV presents an 
assessment of other factors that may be influencing the 
government’s decision to mandate the DoD’s use of domestic 
space launch providers.  In addition, Chapter IV will 
evaluate of the potential effects that the current export 
control regulations may have on the program, as well as any 
protectionist policies that may be influencing the 
government’s policies. 
The final chapter presents the conclusions and 
recommendations developed based on the research conducted.  
The initial conclusions of this thesis suggest that the 
decision to use American-based space launch suppliers 
exclusively, rather than adopt a more diverse strategy, is 
creating more harm than good for the DoD.  This strategy 
appears to be weakening the defense industrial base by 
creating an environment of overreliance on government 
subsidies, rather than focusing on innovation through 
competition in the free market to bolster the American space 
launch industry.  This could translate into a degraded 
ability of the DoD to meet the needs of the nation in 
enhancing its national security and homeland defense. 
  12
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II. CHALLENGES WITHIN THE DOMESTIC SPACE LAUNCH 
MARKET 
Since the Global War on Terrorism began in 2001, the 
U.S. Defense budget is increasing at rates not seen since 
the end of the Cold War, accounting for 4.3 percent of the 
nation’s gross domestic product and surpassing more than 
$335 billion spent since the turn of the century.22  
However, the question of the day is not why we are spending 
so much, but rather, how long we can continue to support a 
defense budget that has increased 89 percent over the past 
decade?23  The budget is guided by outdated policies that 
are forcing the DoD to enter into fiscally irresponsible 
decisions, with no apparent national security 
justifications.  
To understand the goals and objectives of the DoD’s 
strategy of meeting its access to space requirements 
requires an understanding of the primary factors influencing 
the strategy.  Therefore, this chapter presents an 
evaluation of the current environment, in the hopes that it 
will help determine whether the DoD can afford to continue 
the current strategy into the future.  First, an overview of 
key U.S. policies is presented to shed light into the 
guidance the DoD is receiving about how it must fulfill its 
requirements.  The second part of this chapter examines the 
current strategy chosen by the DoD, highlighting the recent 
history and future trends within the domestic space launch 
                     
22 Anup Shah, “World Military Spending,” Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, July 7, 2010. 
23 Shah, “World Military Spending.” 
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industry.  The final section of this chapter examines the 
current state of the EELV program, stressing the challenges 
the DoD faces in meeting the fundamental tenets of achieving 
the United States’ goal of affordable, assured access to 
space in the future.  
A. U.S. POLICY OVERVIEW 
The Department of Defense’s decision as to which space 
launch provider it selects to meet its mission needs is not 
a decision that is solely up to the department’s leadership.  
This decision is ultimately guided and influenced by the 
policies issued, not only from within the DoD, but from the 
Office of the President, the Department of Homeland 
Security, and a host of other agencies, as well as 
directives that are codified in public law.  These policies 
should seek to maximize the efficient use of taxpayer 
dollars to obtain America’s national security objectives.  
However, space systems have become the fastest-growing DoD 
procurement area over the past ten years, increasing at a 
real annual rate of 16.2 percent per year. It is also 
quadrupling the space system’s procurement budget, of which 
maintaining the space launch capability represents 39 
percent.24  The predicament remains, does the current 
practice of using only domestic providers accomplish the 




                     
24 Todd Harrison, Looking Ahead to the FY 2011 Defense Budget: A 
Review of the Past Decade and Implications for the Future Year Defense 
Program, 15–17. 
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timely means by which the DoD can access to space, or is the 
DoD being used as a tool to maintain the domestic space 
launch industry?25  
To gain more insight into issue an examination of the 
governing space-related policies will help determine whether 
the DoD is using the proper strategy to fulfill its mission 
requirements.  This section takes a holistic view of the 
governing policies to determine if the DoD is operating with 
a fiscally responsible strategy, one that preserves and 
limits national security concerns, or possibly a combination 
of both.  In addition, this section evaluates the current 
trends and future implications that the current space 
related policies may hold for the DoD’s access to space 
capability. 
1. 2010 National Space Policy 
The National Space Policy provides a broad overview of 
the nation’s intended near- and long-term goals, along with 
guidance on how governmental agencies are to meet them.  The 
2010 National Space Policy was lauded by the Executive 
Branch’s Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), and 
the DoD as a policy that would emphasize the importance and 
necessity international cooperation would play in order for 
the U.S. government to meet the goals and priorities set 
forth in the 2010 National Space Policy.26  Michael Nacht, 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic 
Affairs, cited that the “flat” and “declining military space 
                     
25 Executive Office of the President, National Science and Technology 
Council, U.S. National Space Policy, 14. 
26 Amy Klamper, “Obama Space Policy to Emphasize International 
Cooperation,” Space News, November 30, 2009. 
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budgets” is one of the driving factors behind the self-
proclaimed “dramatic overhaul” of America’s National Space 
Policy.27  However, the 2010 National Space Policy differs 
little from the 2006 National Space Policy in regards to 
bolstering and expanding the DoD’s ability to maintain its 
assured access to space.  In fact, the 2010 policy offers 
several contradictory policy goals that seek to bolster 
America’s ability to access space, while helping to preserve 
America’s national security posture. 
While many of the tenets of the new space policy stress 
a renewed emphasis for more international cooperation, one 
area stands apart.  The 2010 policy states that the United 
States must “enhance capabilities for assured access to 
space” and thus directs that “United States Government 
payloads shall be launched on vehicles manufactured in the 
United States.”28  Additionally, this policy assigns the 
Secretary of Defense with the responsibility to act as the 
space launch provider for both the defense and intelligence 
sectors with the goal to provide “reliable, affordable, and 
timely space access.”29 
Intuitively, this disagrees with many of the other 
tenets of the policy, which ultimately stresses that to 
strengthen and energize America’s space industry and our 
national defense, the nation must come to accept and promote 
international cooperation and actively explore the use of 
“inventive and nontraditional arrangements” for meeting of 
                     
27 Turner Brinton, “International Cooperation Emphasis of Forthcoming 
U.S. Space Policy.”  
28 Executive Office of the President, U.S. National Space Policy, 5. 
29 Executive Office of the President, U.S. National Space Policy, 14. 
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national goals.30  However, the most contradictory point of 
this policy is that, while explicitly directing the DoD to 
use only domestic suppliers, it later directs the Secretary 
of Defense to implement “plans, procedures, techniques, and 
capabilities” to protect our national security posture by 
leveraging strategies that embrace allied and foreign 
cooperation.31  This string of discrepancies and 
contradictions has distorted how and why the DoD should use 
international cooperation to achieve the goals set forth in 
this policy, making it an ineffective tool to ensure the DoD 
accomplishes its mission in the most effective and efficient 
manner.  
2. National Security Presidential Directive 40 
As a direct result of guidance set forth in the U.S. 
National Space Policy, the Office of the President issued 
the U.S. Space Transportation Policy, which further defines 
the roles, responsibilities, and limitations of the DoD to 
achieve and maintain assured access to space.  The U.S. 
Space Transportation Policy, also referred to as National 
Security Presidential Directive 40 (NSPD 40), outlines, in 
detail, the rationale for why the exclusive use of domestic 
space launch providers is prudent. 
The fundamental goal of NSPD 40 defines a framework by 
which the government operates to ensure the continued 
capability to “access and use space” to support national 
                     
30 Executive Office of the President, U.S. National Space Policy, 10. 
31 Executive Office of the President, U.S. National Space Policy, 13. 
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security interests.32  The first critical point this 
directive establishes is that it defines for the DoD what 
assured access to space means to the DoD.  The directive 
states assured access to space is a key component to 
national security and defines it as “sufficiently robust, 
responsive, and resilient capacity to allow continued space 
operations, consistent with risk management and 
affordability guidelines.”33  The second main point outlined 
is that it commits the DoD to use the EELV program for the 
“foreseeable future” to launch its payloads as long as it 
remains within “mission, performance, cost, and schedule 
requirements.”34  The final point of the directive clearly 
states that a viable domestic industrial base is the 
linchpin to maintaining America’s access to space for 
national security concerns. It goes on to reiterate, once 
again, that all DoD payloads are to use domestic providers, 
unless specifically exempted by the Director of the Office 
of Science and Technology Policy and the Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs.35 
The policy does recognize, however, that the question 
of how to best achieve the mission requirements may not 
always lie in a domestic-only answer.  The directive 
specifically recognizes that in situations where there is 
international cooperation readily available to develop and 
                     
32 Executive Office of the President, National Science and Technology 
Council, U.S. Space Transportation Policy (Washington, D.C.: Office of 
Science and Technology Policy, 2005), 2. 
33 Executive Office of the President, National Science and Technology 
Council, 3. 
34 Executive Office of the President, U.S. Space Transportation 
Policy, 3. 
35 Executive Office of the President, U.S. Space Transportation 
Policy, 7. 
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field systems, this restriction does not apply.  This point 
is critical considering that the 2010 U.S. National Space 
Policy also emphasizes the need to engage and expand the 
amount of international cooperation the United States has 
concerning its space-related activities.  The U.S. Space 
Transportation does an excellent job at defining the roles 
and responsibilities of the DoD in regards to assuring the 
nation’s access to space.  Unfortunately, the current 
policy, as with the U.S. National Space Policy, is 
contradictory in its proclamation as to the value of 
international cooperation while simultaneously restricting 
its use to assure the DoD efficiently employs its space 
launch strategy.   
3. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 and 
Department of Defense Directive 3020.40 
Established in 2002, the Department of Homeland 
Security’s primary mission was to serve as the focal point 
to lead the national effort to protect America from those 
wishing to harm or disrupt our way of life.36 Since that 
time, it has evolved to encompass many other missions, of 
which the protection of critical infrastructure is but one.  
The Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD 7) 
establishes a national policy that helps to prioritize 
critical infrastructure items and then outlines who has the 




                     
36 Department of Homeland Security, “Strategic Plan: One Team, One 
Mission, Securing Our Homeland.”  
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explicitly identified the DoD as the federal agency 
responsible to enforce and strengthen the defense industrial 
base.37   
In response to this assigned responsibility, the DoD 
issued DoD Directive (DoDD) 3020.40, which outlined the 
roles and responsibilities that the DoD would engage in to 
protect the defense industrial base.  Throughout the 
directive, several sectors within the DoD were assigned the 
responsibility to “provide guidance to; monitor the 
activities of; and review, validate, and advocate funding” 
for the protection of key defense industry facilities and 
capabilities.38  The directive goes on to indicate that the 
DoD should incorporate requirements for the risk management 
and mitigation of the defense industry into their 
acquisition and maintenance contracts.39   
While both HSPD 7 and DoDD 3020.40 seek to identify and 
define how the DoD should go about protecting the defense 
industrial base, it does a poor job at detailing exactly how 
far the government should go to “protect and preserve” these 
key resources.  Such ambiguity, without clarification, leads 
to the speculation that one method of protecting the 
industrial base may be through the awarding of government  
 
 
                     
37 Text of the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical 
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, as issued 
by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security on December 17, 2003, on the 
Department of Homeland Security’s website. 
38 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 3020.40 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2010), 7.  
39 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 3020.40, 
12. 
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procurement contracts to maintain a viable industry, 
regardless of whether it is in the department’s best 
interests to do so. 
4. Policy Regarding Assured Access to Space: 
National Security Payloads U.S. Code Title 10, 
Section 2273  
The U.S. code title 10, section 2273) was amended in 
November of 2003 (to incorporate a new law concerning the 
DoD’s procurement and sustainment of America’s capability to 
access space.  This piece of legislation guides the actions 
of the DoD’s acquisition practice and is perhaps the most 
influential and unexplainable piece.  The law states the DoD 
shall take appropriate actions to ensure its space launch 
capability is preserved, and specifically states the DoD 
must protect the following aspects of it: 
(1) the availability of at least two space launch 
vehicles (or families of space launch vehicles) 
capable of delivering into space any payload 
designated by the Secretary of Defense or the 
Director of National Intelligence as a national 
security payload; and (2) a robust space launch 
infrastructure and industrial base.40 
Through the codification of these requirements, the DoD 
is legally obligated to sustain two domestic launch service 
providers and ensure that the industrial base must be 
maintained.  While this law helps to preserve the DoD’s 
ability to provide assured access to space, it fails to  
 
 
                     
40 Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute, “US Code: Title 
10, Subtitle A, Part IV, Chapter 135, § 2273, Policy regarding assured 
access to space: national security payloads.”  
  22
recognize that it may not be helping the DoD meet its 
mission requirements in the most efficient and effective 
manner possible. 
B. THE EVOLVED EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE PROGRAM 
The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Program 
was born out of the necessity to replace the aging fleet of 
Atlas, Delta, and Titan launch systems with one that would 
ultimately reduce the cost of launching DoD and commercial 
satellites into space.41  The government at the time 
believed that this new program would not only replace the 
aging fleet, but would serve as a catalyst to improve the 
technology and manufacturing capability of the defense 
industrial base to make vehicles safer, more reliable, and 
ultimately result in cost savings for the DoD.42  In 1998, 
the Air Force, as the DoD executive agent for space, issued 
an Operational Requirements Document outlining what the 
government was trying to achieve in the acquisition and 
development of the EELV system.  The overarching goals of 
the EELV program were threefold.  First and foremost the 
EELV program was intended to provide the DoD with the means 
to assure its access to space and meet the department’s 
peace and wartime requirements.43  Second, the program was 
intended to lower the overall cost of space lift by reducing 
the acquisition and life-cycle cost by 25 to 50 percent, 
                     
41 Department of Transportation, Special Report: The U.S. Evolved 
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Programs (Washington D.C.: Department 
of Transportation, 1997), SR-1. 
42 Department of Transportation, Special Report: The U.S. Evolved 
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Programs, SR-1. 
43 Richard Meyers, Air Force Space Command Operational Requirements 
Document II for The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle System (Washington 
D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 1998), 1. 
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making it more affordable given the current decline in the 
DoD’s discretionary budget.44  The third goal of the program 
was to enhance and bolster the American space launch 
industry, placing it into a better position to become more 
competitive in the international market and thus hoping to 
increase the United State’s market share from 35 to 50 
percent of the international market.45   
After several iterations of competitive concept 
validation, the DoD deicide to enter into a partnership with 
industry to develop and field two competing systems. The DoD 
took this action with the hopes that, together, they could 
achieve the desired reduction in costs and meet the mission 
requirements for the next twenty years.46  The Air Force 
awarded two EELV contracts in October 1998, with a combined 
value of $2.03 billion, to Lockheed Martin with their Atlas 
V rocket and The Boeing Company with their Delta IV system. 
They were to supply the DoD with what was supposed to be a 
redundant capability from which they could assure their 
access space was preserved.47 
Unfortunately, many of the early forecasts and 
predictions that the EELV program were based upon turned out 
to be highly optimistic and eventually unachievable.  The 
                     
44 Meyers, Air Force Space Command Operational Requirements Document 
II for The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle System, 1; Department of 
Transportation, “Special Report: The U.S. Evolved Expendable Launch 
Vehicle (EELV) Programs,” SR-1. 
45 Meyers, Air Force Space Command Operational Requirements Document. 
46 Linda Drake, James Knauf, and Peter Portanova, “EELV: Evolving 
Toward Affordability,” American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics, Inc. 
47 Government Accountability Office, Space Acquisitions: 
Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program Pose 
Management and Oversight Challenges, 7. 
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DoD and the Air Force were anticipating that the commercial 
launch market would continue to thrive. However, for 
numerous reasons, the commercial launch market collapsed, 
forcing the DoD to reevaluate its acquisition strategy, 
citing in 2003 that the expected launch costs were now 77 
percent higher than its estimates from just a year prior.48  
The dramatic cost overrun flagged the program as being in 
violation of the Nunn–Mccurdy cost breach threshold set 
forth in Title 10 USC section 2433.49  Therefore, based on 
preserving national security, the Secretary of Defense, with 
concurrence from Congress, was forced to authorize the 
establishment of a new cost baseline that increased the 
future estimated launch costs by 29 percent due to 
additional anticipated shortfalls.50  
 
Figure 1. Worldwide Commercial Space Launches51 
                     
48 Government Accountability Office, Space Acquisitions: 
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50 Government Accountability Office, Space Acquisitions: 
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51 Jessica West, Space Security 2009 (Kitchner, Ontario: Pandora 
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In 2005, the realization finally set in that the 
government had become the primary consumer of the domestic 
market, and the DoD set out once again to realign the EELV 
program to meet the needs being dictated by the market.  
This change was concurrent with the Boeing Company and 
Lockheed Martin entering into a joint venture, which would 
ultimately combine all aspects of their respective space 
launch capability into a single source. The goal was to 
maximize their efficiencies to provide the DoD with assured 
access to space with what they hoped would be a significant 
reduction in cost.52  The new joint venture became known as 
The United Launch Alliance (ULA). 
C. REALITIES OF THE DOD’S ASSURED ACCESS TO SPACE PROGRAM 
The DoD’s ability to continue to provide a reliable, 
affordable, and timely mechanism by which to maintain 
America’s assured access to space is becoming more difficult 
every day.  The strategy the DoD constructed relies upon a 
healthy and robust commercial space launch market from which 
a commercially driven market would foster technological 
innovation, while reducing the cost per launch for the 
government.  Unfortunately, ever since the commercial space 
launch market dried up in the early part of this decade, the 
DoD has been struggling to find the proper level of 
government and industrial partnership that would assure the 
DoD could meet its mission requirements while preserving and 
creating a viable industrial base. 
 
                     
52 Government Accountability Office, Space Acquisitions: 
Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program Pose 




Figure 2. World Wide Demand vs. Forecasted Predictions53 
1. UNSTABLE COST GROWTH AND INACCURATE FORECASTS   
When the DoD began exploring the many options to ensure 
its continued access to space, reducing the overall cost of 
space launch was one of the top priorities, with a goal of 
achieving cost savings of 25 to 50 percent over the heritage 
launch systems.54  Unfortunately, one of the biggest 
problems affecting the success of the DoD’s EELV program has 
been its inability to accurately forecast and control the 
cost of the program.  A recent study conducted by the Center 
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments indicates that the 
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systems, increasing from a real annual rate of $1.0 billion 




Figure 3. Space Systems Procurement Funding (in billions of 
FY10 dollars)56 
 
Table 1.  Top DoD Space Systems Procurements57 
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More specifically, the funding allocated to procure 
launch systems and maintain supporting infrastructure 
comprised more than 39 percent of the 2010 space system’s 
overall budget and was second in total spending forecasts 
for Fiscal year (FY) 2010, with $1.3 billion of the cost 
increase attributed to uncontrollable costs and the 
inability to deliver products and services on schedule.58   
In 2004, the GAO performed an assessment to determine 
whether the EELV program was actually meeting the DoD’s goal 
of providing assured access to space at a reduced cost to 
the government.  The report indicated that the EELV program 
was making progress in achieving its goal, but because of 
the significant cost increases, the program office would 
ultimately be forced to alter its acquisition strategy.59  
Specifically, the GAO noted that the program’s costs 
increased by $13.3 billion over the 2002 program baseline of 
$18.8 billion, of which nearly $11 billion was attributed to 
the incorrect assumptions about the viability of the 
commercial market and incorrect pricing forecasts.60 
Similarly, an internal assessment conducted by the U.S. 
Air Force in March 2010 revealed that the DoD continues to 
struggle in providing accurate forecasts in regards to space 
launch, and were forced to rely on overoptimistic 
contractor-provided estimates on which to base future 
                     
58 Harrison, Looking Ahead, 16–17. 
59 Government Accountability Office, Defense Space Activities: 
Continuation of Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program’s Progress to 
Date Subject to Some Uncertainty (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Accountability Office, 2004), 3–8. 
60 Government Accountability Office, Defense Space Activities, 7–8.  
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funding requests.61  This factor is seen readily when 
comparing the EELV program’s current and original forecast 
to those of other major space acquisition programs, as 
depicted in Figure 4.  The EELV program has outpaced its 
original estimate by nearly 100 percent since the business 
case for EELV was presented and accepted by the DoD.   
 
Figure 4. Current vs. Original Estimates for Major Systems62 
Regardless of the magnitude of these overruns and the 
inaccuracies of its forecasts, the DoD is continuing to use 
optimistic estimates from ULA on which to base FY 2010 to FY 
2015 budget, hoping to realize more than $105 million in 
savings per year beginning in FY 2011.63  The DoD predicts 
these savings will materialize based on anticipated 
programmatic efficiencies over the next four years.  Despite 
this optimistic approach, the EELV program requirements are 
still projected to overrun the allocated budget by more than 
                     
61 Government Accountability Office, Space Acquisitions, 17–18; Curt 
Khol and John Tomick, “EELV Program Assessment,” 19–22. 
62 Harrison, Looking Ahead, 16. 
63 Government Accountability Office, Space Acquisitions, 17–18. 
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$3.3 billion between 2011 and 2015, leading one to believe 
that the current system and methodology is unsustainable. 64  
2. DEVELOPING A RELIABLE SYSTEM 
The second major goal of the EELV program was to 
develop and procure a reliable system for the DoD to use in 
launching its payloads to replace the ageing heritage 
systems.65  In regards to this priority, the DoD and the 
EELV program have performed within their targeted goals: 
Launching 30 missions without a catastrophic failure and 
maintaining an average reliability factor of 81.5 percent 
for the Delta-IV system and 89.7 percent for the Atlas-V 
system.66  However, DoD officials cautiously warn that the 
EELV program is still in its infancy when compared to the 
heritage programs, which had 232 successful launches and 
whose reliability factors range between 85.4 percent for the 
Titan-IV system and 98.0 percent for the Delta-II system.67 
                     
64 Khol and Tomick, “EELV Program Assessment,” 22. 
65 Meyers, Air Force Space Command Operational Requirements Document 
(ORD) II for The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle System, 1. 
66 The Reliability factor is determined by the vehicle’s ability to 
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(PowerPoint Presentation, The Aerospace Corporation, 2008), 16. 













































































Figure 5. Reliability of EELV and Heritage Systems68 
Perhaps the biggest technical risk identified within 
the EELV program deals with the inability of the government 
and industry partners to hire and retain appropriately 
trained personnel.  Numerous GAO investigations have 
revealed that the workforce in both the government’s EELV 
program office and those of the industrial base are becoming 
anemic.69  Both are lacking the “technical expertise to 
develop highly complex space systems,” a fact that is 
attributed to an overall shortage of qualified scientists 
and aerospace engineers.70 As part of the GAO investigation, 
it was also discovered that the Air Force’s program office 
                     
68 Tomei, “EELV Decision History,” 16. 
69 Chaplain, Space Acquisitions: Government and Industry Partners 
Face Substantial Challenges in Developing New DOD Space Systems, 11–12; 
Chaplain, Space Acquisition: DOD Faces Substantial Challenges in 
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was not only deficient in the number of technically 
qualified individuals (currently under 67 percent manned to 
requirements), but there were also deficiencies in the 
proper mix of personnel, in general. These deficiencies 
would preclude the program office from effectively managing 
the cost reimbursement acquisition contact used to procure 
the EELV system, hampering their overall ability to complete 
their current workload.71  With personnel shortages from 
both the industry and the government program office, the 
risk of being unable to deliver reliable launch systems on 
schedule, and maintain realistic cost baselines, becomes 
problematic. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The laws and policies concerning the actions of the DoD 
are clear in regards to how it should go about preserving 
its access to space.  Codified in policy and law, the DoD 
must use and preserve two domestic suppliers, which will 
ultimately support the goal of enhancing our national 
security through the preservation of what has become viewed 
as a key defense industry. Unfortunately, the very policies 
directed to preserve this capability may be creating an 
unaffordable spending environment, while simultaneously 
weakening the American space launch industry’s ability to 
compete in the world market because of their reliance on 
government patronage and subsidies.72   
By all measures, the EELV program does in fact offer 
great potential to the DoD as a safe and reliable system.  
                     
71 Chaplain, Space Acquisition, 14, 25–28. 
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The program has met most of its technical milestones and is 
achieving a mission reliability factor that is in line with 
expectations.  Despite this success, the DoD and ULA are 
still struggling to find efficiencies that will help them to 
better understand and control the escalating costs the DoD 
is paying to keep the industry viable.73  Regrettably, this 
concern is amplified by the fact the DoD and its industry 
partners cannot seem to attract and retain the proper mix of 
personnel possessing the right mix of technical and 
programmatic skills required to manage a program of this 
size and complexity.   
Furthermore, the progress the DoD has made to date to 
contain costs and provide forecasts that are more accurate 
to senior leaders within the DoD and Congress may become 
challenged once again.  With the recent decision to 
terminate NASA’s Constellation program, the economies of 
scale that were helping to lower the cost of the EELV 
program to the DoD may be lost, resulting in the DoD being 
forced to absorb the rising costs once again in order to 
preserve the viability of the ULA.74  These points reinforce 
the validity of questioning whether the DoD can afford to 
continue with the current strategy of maintaining access to 
space, or whether it is time to consider an alternative 
strategy. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN SUPPLIERS 
This chapter addresses the DoD’s technical requirements 
inherent to launching its systems and then analyzes the 
capability, reliability, costs, and potential national 
security concerns associated with these various launch 
systems.  While numerous states and international 
consortiums throughout the world are certainly capable of 
launching DoD satellites, this assessment focuses only on 
those entities with which the United States currently has 
amicable relationships.  These systems are the focus of the 
EELV program alternatives that should be considered for use 
by the DoD.   
This chapter begins by defining, on a broad scale, what 
the technical launch requirements are for the current suite 
of DoD satellites.  Next, this chapter examines the 
capability, reliability, and costs of the DoD’s current 
space launch provider, United Launch Alliance.  Finally, the 
chapter presents three foreign space launch providers whose 
system’s capability and reliability are such that the DoD 
could, from a technical standpoint, use their services, as a 
viable alternative to achieve the nation’s assured access to 
space requirement.75 
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SATELLITE SYSTEMS 
The primary mission of the DoD’s space systems is to 
provide the nation with the capability to conduct and 
                     
75 The three alternative space launch providers presented are the 
European Union’s Arianespace Consortium, Japan’s Aerospace Exploration 
Agency, and the Sea Launch Consortium. 
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support military operations from and through space to 
enhance our military affectivity and to bolster America’s 
Homeland Security and National Defense.76  The DoD 
accomplishes this by means of the U.S. Navy and Air Force 
procuring meteorological, communications, navigation, and 
early warning satellites systems (Table 2) from companies 
within the domestic defense industrial base.  Once the 
satellites have been built and adequately tested, they are 
shipped to the launch site where they are integrated and 
launched from a medium class EELV rocket. 
Table 2.  Current DoD Unclassified Programs77 
CURRENT DoD PROGRAMS FUNCTION ORBIT WEIGHT Lbs (Kg) MANUFACTURER
Defense Metoerological Satellite Program (DMSP) Meteorology LEO 2,720 (1,233) Lockheed Martin
National Polar‐Orbiting Operation Environment  Satellite System (NPOESS) Meteorology LEO 14,498 (6,576) Northrup Grumman
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) System Communications GEO 13,421 (6,087) Lockheed Martin
Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) Communications GEO 6,800 (3,084) Lockheed Martin
Wideband Global Satcom (WGS) Communications GEO 10,262 (4,655) Boeing
Global Positioning System (GPS)  Navigation MEO 4,485 (2,035) Lockheed Martin/Boeing













                     
76 Department of the Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2 
(Washington D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 2006), 1. 
77 Department of the Navy, “MUOS Mobile User Objective System,” 
accessed August 20, 2010, 
https://acquisition.navy.mil/rda/home/programs/information_communication
s/muos; Department of the Air Force, The Air Force Handbook: 2007 
(Washington D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 2007), 33–255; LEO is the 
abbreviation for a low Earth orbit, MEO is the abbreviation for a medium 
Earth orbit, HEO is the abbreviation for a highly elliptical orbit, and 




Figure 6. Types of Satellite Earth Orbits78 
B. UNITED STATES’ EVOLVED EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE 
To meet its access to space requirements, the DoD has 
supported and contracted with a joint venture between The 
Boeing Company and Lockheed Martin, known as the United 
Launch Alliance.  As previously noted, the system is 
comprised of two classes of vehicles with varying levels of 
launch capability between them. Altogether, the EELV program 
can satisfy the performance and orbital capability required 
to launch the suite of DoD satellites listed in Table 2.  
Since its first launch in 2002, the EELV program is viewed 
as a success story in terms of its performance and 
reliability for a new system, successfully launching its 
first thirty missions with an average reliability rating of 
81.5 and 89.7 percent, respectively, for the Atlas-V and 
Delta-IV systems.79   
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Figure 7. Atlas V and Delta IV Launch Vehicles80 
Table 3.  EELV System Capability81 
410 431 551 Medium M+(4,2) M+(5,4) Heavy
4,750 kg 7,700 kg 8,900 kg 4,300 kg 6,030 kg 7,020 kg 12,980 kg
10, 470 lb 16,970 lb 19,260 lb 9,480 lb 13,290 lb 15,470 lb 28,620 lb
9,370 kg 15,130 kg 18,510 kg 9,150 kg 12,240 kg 13,360 kg 22,560 kg







Trying to determine the precise cost the DoD pays to 
launch a satellite is difficult.  Prior to EELV, when the 
government manifested a satellite for launch from a certain 
rocket system, it would contract directly with the service 
provider and pay a set price for the service.  However, 
since the collapse of the commercial space launch market, 
                     
80 Khol and Tomick, “EELV Program Assessment,” 7. 
81 “Delta IV: The 21st Century Launch Solution”; “Atlas V: Maximum 
Flexibility and Reliability.” 
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the U.S. government has become the primary customer for ULA, 
and with that has come the burden of also paying for the 
infrastructure and sustainment costs associated with 
maintaining ULA’s ability to safely and reliably launch 
satellites for the DoD.  Unofficial figures place the cost 
per launch starting from $70 million and increasing up to 
$140 million for the Delta IV Heavy rocket.82  
Unfortunately, this cost does not reflect the amount the DoD 
is actually paying for this service.  Figure 8 depicts what 
the cost per vehicle class would be when infrastructure 
costs are factored into the equation (assuming a total of 
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Figure 8. EELV Price vs. Performance Plot83 
The reality is that, in the 2010 National Security 
Space budget, the DoD requested $1.393 billion to launch 
                     
82 Andrews Space and Technology, “Space and Tech: Delta IV 
Specifications”; Andrews Space and Technology, “Space and Tech: Atlas V 
Specs.” 
83 Khol and Tomick, “EELV Program Assessment,” 19. 
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just five satellites from EELV boosters.84  This equates to 
the DoD paying more than $280 million per launch in FY 2010. 
The exact amount, however, depends not only on the 
configuration of the system purchased, but on how many 
launches ULA will actually launch that year, from which it 
can allocate its infrastructure and sustainment costs. 
C. FOREIGN LAUNCH SYSTEMS 
Since the beginning of this decade, the United States, 
along with the rest of the world’s space-faring nations, 
have seen an overcapacity in the space launch market, driven 
by the belief that the commercial demand of the 1990s would 
continue into the foreseeable future.85  This trend has 
resulted in a surplus of safe and efficient launch systems 
from which the DoD could choose to meet mission requirements 
or to augment the existing EELV program.  In fact, the 
market’s overcapacity makes the cost of launching satellites 
a more tangible decision point that the DoD should 
considered as part of its overall strategy.  However, this 
reality stands in stark contrast to a recent RAND report 
that asserts that “launch economics” cannot, and should not, 
be measured using the classical model of supply and demand, 
since the industry is so heavily subsidized, citing that its 
economics are driven by the demand for capability while 
keeping costs low.86  This statement, however, does not 
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obviate the fact that the cost to launch a satellite 
constitutes between 35 and 50 percent of the total cost of 
acquiring the satellite for operation.87  A staggering 
figure when one assumes that many of the satellites procured 
by the DoD can cost upwards of $1 billion. 
For the DoD, however, the cost to launch systems into 
space does not appear to be the driving factor governing its 
assured access to space policies.  The next section presents 
an overview of the foreign space launch systems that are 
capable of reliably delivering the DoD’s payloads to orbit.  
While there are nine nations and consortiums that have the 
capability to launch satellites into space, this assessment 
focuses on addressing the capabilities and efficiencies of 
three due to national security and logistical reasons.  The 
three viable alternatives to ULA’s EELV program are offer 
through the European Union’s Arianespace, Japan’s Aerospace 
Exploration Agency (JAXA), and the Sea Launch international 
consortium. 
1. European Union’s Arianespace Consortium 
The European Union’s European Space Agency’s (ESA) is 
Europe’s answer to NASA and the DoD space program rolled 
into one.  The organization is very similar in operation and 
capability to that of the United States’ EELV program, but 
has several distinct qualities setting it apart from its 
American counterpart.  The primary difference is that the 
organization is built around a consortium of eighteen member 
nations who collectively contribute to the ESA to ensure 
                     
87 McCartney, National Security Space Launch Report, 32. 
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that Europe will have assured access to space from which to 
actively launch commercial and defense-related systems.88 
As with the development and sustainment of the EELV 
program, ESA has developed their Ariane rocket system with 
the help of government subsidies from EU member nations, 
providing a form of “Launch Aid” to ensure the ESA could 
develop a system capable of safely launching any system into 
space.89  Ironically, the United States has been a vocal 
opponent of ESA within the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
arguing that the EU is contributing too much funding to the 
development and sustainment of ESA, citing that government 
subsidies should only be used to facilitate infancy industry 
growth, not to be used as part of a government’s technology 
and strategic trade policies.90 
Next to the EELV launch system, the ESA’s rocket 
systems are some of the most technically advanced and 
capable launch systems in the world.  In fact, the Ariane 
system is considered by many in the space launch community 
to be superior to the EELV system, due in large part to the 
location of its launch facility.  ESA has constructed its 
launch site at Kourou, located in French Guiana.  This site 
offers the advantage of being only 500–km north of the 
equator, enabling it to launch payloads more efficiently 
                     
88 The 18 member nations that contribute to ESA are Austria, Belgium, 
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World Trade 40, no. 3 (2006), 495. 
90 Kaivanto, "Premise and Practice of UK Launch Aid," 495–497; Bill 
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into orbit by taking advantage of the “slingshot effect” 
gained from launching satellites near the equator and not 
having to significantly alter the satellite’s trajectory if 
it is headed to a geostationary orbit.91   
In addition to the advantage its launch site has to 
offer, the Ariane system has developed into a capable and 
reliable system.  The family of Ariane vehicles are capable 
of launching payloads ranging in weight from 10,500 kg to a 
geo-transfer orbit (GTO) and up to 21,000 kg to a low Earth 
orbit, making it an ideal system to launch medium class 
satellites and, more specifically, capable of supporting any 
and all of the DoD’s current system requirements.  In terms 
of its reliability, the Ariane 5 system has exceeded 
expectations and has successfully launched forty-two out of 
forty-four rockets since its creation in 1996, giving it a 
96 percent reliability factor.92  In an effort to enhance 
their space launch capability, the ESA entered into a 
partnership with the Russian space giant Starsem to bring 
the Soyuz launch system to their spaceport in French Guiana 
in 2008.  This capability will further bolster Arianespace’s 
ability to launch medium class satellites with greater 
capacity and frequency, further reducing costs to their 
customers.  In addition to meeting the mission capability 
requirements of the DoD payloads, the reliability of the 
Soyuz system over the past decade has been 99 percent, 
successfully launching 93 out of 94 missions.93  
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In terms of affordability, Arianespace advertises that 
the cost to procure and launch one of its systems ranges 
from $35 to $45 million for its Soyuz class vehicle, and 
approximately $120 million for its larger Ariane 5 class 
vehicles, thereby placing its cost per throw weight 
capability at a level far below the $280 million average per 
launch price the DoD is paying for the EELV system.95 
The ESA’s Arianespace system should be viewed as an 
attractive alternative to the EELV program for several 
reasons.  First, from a technical and systems perspective, 
the EU’s Arianespace offers launch systems that do indeed 
meet the technical requirements of current DoD satellite 
system.  Second, it has been shown that the DoD can achieve 
a cost saving of up to $200 million per satellite if the DoD 
were to contract for a commercial launch service with 
Arianespace, either directly or through the DoD satellite 
manufacturer, as is common practice in the commercial 
market.  Finally, there appears to be no national security 
concern with launching DoD satellites from an allied 
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95 This cost figure does not include the cost to transport and 
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nation’s spaceport with which the DoD is actively 
collaborating with to broaden and expand cooperation in 
numerous other space-related matters per the 2010 National 
Space Policy. 
2. Japan’s Aerospace Exploration Agency 
The Japanese space program was borne out of a 
cooperative mindset, both from the need for technological 
support as well as its pacifist role within the Asian 
Pacific region.  The Japanese space program began in 1955, 
but it was not until it collaborated with the U.S. in 1969 
that its space launch capability began to develop.  The 
United States entered into an agreement known as the 
Exchange of Notes Concerning Cooperation in Space 
Exploration, where the United States allowed the transfer of 
technology necessary to develop a domestic space launch 
capability to Japan in an effort to foster the growth of 
their space program while simultaneously building a stronger 
alliance between the two nations.96  The Japanese National 
Space Development Agency, therefore, collaborated with the 
McDonnell Douglass Corporation to build a version of its 
Delta rocket system, which eventually evolved into their H-
IIA/B system in use today.97  The provisions of the 
transfer, however, prohibited Japan from re-exporting the 
technology, which meant they could not rely on the 
technology to build a successful commercial space launch 
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market.98  The effects of this agreement are still seen 
today in the capability and maturity of Japan’s space launch 
industry. 
In the years since the American investment in the 
Japanese space program, the Japanese Aerospace Exploration 
Agency (JAXA) formed a partnership with Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries and Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries to 
develop their current space launch capability, the H-IIA/B 
rocket system.  The H-II system does not have a long and 
storied history due in large part to the lack of public 
support for a domestic space program, which translated into 
a minimal investment by the government to support and 
promote a commercially competitive program.  However, the 
new systems are capable of launching most of the DoD 
satellite systems into their intended orbits, with the 
exception of the Air Force’s AEHF system, which currently 
surpasses the capabilities of the H-IIA’s lift capacity to 
GTO. 
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In terms of reliability, the initial H-II variant was 
plagued with infancy issues that resulted in two 
catastrophic failures of the H-II system in 1998 and 1999.  
However, since those two failures, JAXA appears to have 
resolved their rocket’s issues and have since successfully 
launched each of their last fifteen missions manifested for 
the H-IIA/B, giving the system a reliability factor of 100 
percent.100  This success rate, coupled with a cost-per-
mission ranging from $100 to $140 million per launch, makes 
JAXA’s H-IIA/B an attractive alternative for consideration 
by the United States for use in launching DoD satellites. 
Just as proponents argued that international 
cooperation between the DoD and the ESA could foster a 
stronger alliance between the United States and the EU, many 
believe that another agreement between Japan and the United 
States to cooperate on matters of space launch could prove 
beneficial.101  Japan is already a strategic U.S. ally in 
the region, but one that is currently restricted by its own 
ability to project power, thereby becoming a stronger ally 
in the region, helping to deter many of the aggressive 
actions by North Korea and China.  In a recent report, the 
Center of Strategic and International Studies asserts that 
there is a “mutual dependency” between the United States and 
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and protection, and that the key to accomplishing this was 
through more cooperation, specifically through enhancing 
their space-based capabilities.102   
However, several factors may pose a problem to 
launching DoD payloads from the H-IIA/B system, the primary 
of which is still the protection of sensitive information 
and technology.  Several instances over the past twenty 
years have reinforced this belief.  In the 1990s, there were 
several instances where it was suspected that several U.S. 
domestic satellite corporation’s proprietary technology was 
stolen by China in an effort to enhance their own 
capabilities.103  To further exacerbate the situation, it 
was noted on several occasions in the past ten years that 
Japan might have serious security concerns when it comes to 
protecting sensitive information, not only from domestic 
organized crime syndicates, but also from foreign espionage 
perpetrated by North Korea and China.104  These factors give 
credence to the belief that launching DoD satellites from 
Japan, or any other foreign nation, may jeopardize the 
security and protection of American technology as well as 
sensitive national security information employed by the DoD 
and its industry partners, thereby threatening our national 
security. 
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3. Sea Launch 
Sea Launch is a multinational endeavor established in 
1995 between The Boeing Company’s Space Systems, Russia’s 
RSC-Energia, Norway’s Aker Kvaerner, and Ukrainian’s SDO 
Yuzhnoye/PO Yuzhmash corporations.105  The premise of the 
venture is simple; rather than processing and launching 
satellites from a land-based facility, Sea Launch developed 
a new approach where the rocket and satellite are processed 
for launch on land, then transported via a converted 
floating oil rig into the Pacific Ocean to be launched at 
the equator.  This option is beneficial for numerous 
reasons.  First, by creating a hybrid system, Sea Launch is 
able to process the rocket and satellite from its port 
facilities in Long Beach, California, thereby offering a 
domestic processing facility.  This would enable the DoD to 
maintain positive control and access to their satellite 
systems, thus minimizing their concerns for the inadvertent 
transfer of technology to foreign nationals. 
The second major advantage that Sea Launch offers is 
that it is capable of launching the system into orbit from 
the equator, thus eliminating the need to perform any 
additional plane changes for satellites being launched into 
a geosynchronous orbit.  This enables the system to take 
advantage of the rotation of the Earth to help “slingshot” 
the rocket into orbit, ultimately saving fuel and thus 
prolonging the life of the satellite once in orbit.106 
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The Sea Launch system centers around the Zenit-3SL 
rocket system built cooperatively between Russia’s RSC 
Energia, the Ukraine’s SDO Yuzhnoye/PO Yuzhmash, and the 
Boeing Corporation.  The Zenit-3SL system is a derivative of 
the Russian Zenit-2 system, but was subsequently modified 
with a third-stage motor to help deliver its payload into 
orbit without sacrificing any capability.  As mentioned 
earlier, due to its ability to launch from the equator, the 
Zenit-3SL system is capable of launching heavier systems 
into space without sacrificing fuel.  Ultimately, the Sea 
Launch system is capable of launching the entire spectrum of 
DoD payloads into geosynchronous or low Earth orbit. 









In terms of system reliability, the Sea Launch system 
has successfully delivered thirty-one of its thirty-three 
missions to the desired target orbit, resulting in a success 
rate of 93.9 percent and a reliability rate of 92.2 
percent.108 
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The Sea Launch consortium is not without its 
limitations and shortfalls.  In June of 2009, the commercial 
consortium filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, unable to 
survive the faltering space launch economy under its current 
operational structure.109  Then, in July of 2010, just 
thirteen months after filing for bankruptcy, the consortium 
announced that it has reached an agreement to stay in 
business by restructuring its holding and shareholders.110  
The major restructuring within Sea Launch was with the 
Russian space giant Energie, bid to acquire 85 percent 
ownership in the company, thereby removing The Boeing 
Company from the leadership role.111  This change in 
ownership from an American-led consortium to a Russian-led 
one places the operational and logistical baseline of the 
Sea Launch system in jeopardy, especially when viewed in 
terms of it becoming a realistic alternative for the DoD to 
use in accessing space.112 
D. CONCLUSION 
Several proponents within the DoD, NATO, and the space 
launch industry argue that a partnership in the space launch 
realm would offer more benefits to the DoD than just 
launching a satellite more efficiently.  Most notably, Air 
Commodore Jan A. H. van Hoof asserts that to achieve NATO’s 
key space operations concerns there should be a greater 
amount of cooperation to assure access to the space domain 
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for all its members.113  This position is echoed within the 
DoD, citing that the they would benefit from such an 
international partnership by creating a technological 
interdependence between the United States and its key 
European allies if they were to extend the level of 
interoperability and cooperation between key allied 
nations.114 This would help to reduce stringent and outdated 
export restrictions, which would potentially result in a 
greater level of cooperation between the EU and the United 
States on space-related matters.115   
The matter of launching American-made satellites with 
foreign systems is not a new concept.  The space launch 
industry has become extremely competitive, driven by the 
large number of space launch providers who are capable of 
reliably and efficiently launching satellites into orbit.  
Numerous U.S.-produced satellite systems, intended for both 
commercial and civil missions, have already been launched 
from foreign launch systems.  This factor within the current 
space launch environment is important for the DoD to 
understand as it moves forwards in meeting its access to 
space mission for several important reasons.   
First, it shows that American-based corporations can 
successfully launch and their satellites systems from 
foreign suppliers, eliminating the bureaucratic and 
technical risks present in the infrastructures and operating 
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protocols between them.  Second, it illustrates that when 
the capability and reliability of domestic and foreign 
systems are equal, the cost of delivering a system to space 
can trump concerns of using a foreign corporation to meet 
access to space needs.  Third, since NASA has successfully 
contracted with and used foreign space launch suppliers to 
meet its mission needs, there is now a legal and political 
precedence for the U.S. government and the DoD to launch 
other government systems using a collaborative approach 
between domestic and foreign service providers.  Finally, 
and perhaps most applicable, it indicates that the risk of 
transferring a potential dual-use technology, inherent in 
U.S. satellite systems, to foreign nations is minimal with 
the proper protocols in place. This logic holds, since the 
same manufacturers who produce satellites for the commercial 
and civil customers are in many instances using the same 
technology to build and field DoD systems.  These factors 
encourage the belief that the government should not dismiss 
the option to use foreign suppliers if they can do so in a 
safe, secure, and cost-effective manner.   
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IV. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 
Should the United States pursue a strategy to fulfill 
their assured access to space requirements based solely on 
the capability, reliability, and relative cost of a space 
launch system?  That choice may not be the driving factor 
behind the decision to mandate the DoD to exclusively use 
domestic suppliers.  Instead, the decision may be linked to 
political and economic factors that are influencing, if not 
forcing, the DoD to operate in the manner in which it is to 
procure and maintain its access to space requirements.   
This chapter presents an overview of other contributing 
factors that may potentially be influencing the DoD’s 
consistent and unyielding strategy.  First, this chapter 
explores the influence that the current export control laws 
and regulations have on the DoD.  While these laws are 
designed primarily to regulate and control the commercial 
entities within the United States, the two sides of the coin 
cannot be separated.  History has shown that commercial and 
government programs are interdependent, and if a restriction 
is placed on one entity, it will inevitably affect the 
other.  The next section explores the notion that the DoD is 
pursuing their current methodology as part of a greater 
strategy designed to protect and bolster the American space 
industrial base.  This form of “economic protectionism,” 
while intended to protect and stimulate the economic base, 
may in fact be creating more unfavorable consequences than 
intended.  The final section evaluates the interpretation of 
the 2010 National Security Strategy to determine what, if 
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any, national security implications may come with the DoD’s 
use of a foreign versus domestic space launch provider. 
A. EXPORT CONTROL LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
The 2010 National Space Policy is constructed not only 
to satisfy the President’s National Security Strategy, but 
also to fall in line with current policies and laws 
governing the protection of sensitive space-related 
technologies.  It is through this elaborate set of 
regulations that the DoD’s ability to efficiently and 
reliably meet its access to space requirements is becoming 
an issue.  These policies and regulations are limiting the 
number of viable options available for use by the DoD, 
civil, and commercial satellite manufacturers to choose from 
when deciding how to best launch their satellites.  This 
point is further exacerbated by the Department of States’ 
interpretation and implementation of its International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) as it pertains to 
satellite and launch vehicle exports. 
The Arms Control Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 2778) 
established the International Traffic in Arms Regulation as 
the governing body of regulation that formed the building 
blocks which was later incorporated into the Code of Federal 
Regulations (22 CFR 120–130) concerning the use of foreign 
space launch systems.  The importance of this regulation is 
that it grants the President the authority to “…control the 
export and import of defense articles and defense 
services.”116  Furthermore, it delegates this authority to 
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the U.S. Department of State, not only to decide which 
defense articles and services are subject to ITAR, but also 
to manage the ITAR program as a whole.  The regulation goes 
on to clarify that communication, remote sensing, scientific 
research, navigation, experimental, and multi-mission 
satellites are to be considered “Significant Military 
Equipment” because of their “capacity for substantial 
military utility or capability.”117  Therefore, all DoD 
satellites fall under the ITAR’s purview, regardless of 
their classification or technological sensitivity level. 
Recently, numerous agencies and government reviews have 
noted that this restrictive regulation is in fact doing more 
harm than good to preserve America’s national security when 
viewed in the context of assured access to space.118  A 
report issued from the Center for Space and Defense Studies 
examined the bureaucratic politics behind the implementation 
and enforcement of domestic satellite export controls.119  
The report examined not only the effects of export controls 
upon the DoD, but went on to show how overly stringent 
export controls on commercial satellites affect economic and 
national security.  The legal basis behind restricting 
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commercial satellites launched from foreign systems is a 
side effect of trying to contain the spread of American 
technology deemed dual-use to our international rivals; as 
such, the Executive branch handles the export of such 
technology in the same manner as it would handle the 
trafficking control of weapon technology.120  The report 
concluded that after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the 
United States, business and economic concerns would never 
again trump national security concerns.121  Therefore, an 
overly stringent export control policy has endured, 
weakening the American defense industrial base upon which 
the DoD has become reliant for its access to space 
requirements. 
These findings are not solitary.  The Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) conducted a study 
to examine the relationship between the current export 
control strategy and its effects on national security.122  
While the findings of the report do acknowledge that the 
current export controls on space-related technology are 
overly stringent, the report went on to examine the economic 
and national security implications of maintaining such an 
archaic system.  The CSIS report, however, goes on to show 
why mandating U.S. commercial and defense satellites to be 
launched exclusively from domestic launch systems is 
creating an environment that is eroding the U.S. space-
industrial base, and that America’s assured access to space 
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should be viewed and treated as an important national 
security priority, rather than a by–product of it.123  
One of the most significant actions taken to address 
this issue was the passage of the Commercial Space Launch 
Act (CSLA) in 1988, and its amended version in 2004.  The 
CSLA was intended to increase the level of commercial 
involvement in the space launch industry, which in turn 
could spur economic growth in this area, thus fulfilling not 
only America’s national security concerns, but addressing 
its economic concerns as well.124  At the time, the optimal 
method of satisfying this national security priority was to 
develop additional capacity through commercial means and 
then maintain a robust and reliable space launch program 
with enough capacity to launch all commercial and DoD 
satellites.125 
Unfortunately, the current export control regulations 
and national space policies have created an environment that 
primarily protects America’s national security assets, 
rather than preserving the defense industrial base.  Since 
1995, the United States has gone from being the preeminent 
space power, controlling 73 percent of the market, to 
controlling only 25 percent, just a decade later.126 
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Figure 9. Waning Dominance of United States in Space127 
 
Figure 10. U.S. Market Share of Commercial and Government 
Satellites128 
This paradigm shift has resulted in an industrial base 
that is continuing to lose its competitive edge in the 
global market and is becoming more dependent on government 
subsidization to remain competitive and viable.  While it 
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cannot said that this trend is a causal effect of the 
current export control regulations, numerous proponents tend 
to agree that these regulations certainly are not helping to 
address the issue or to aid in reversing the trend.129 
Since the U.S.-produced satellites came under the 
Department of State’s ITAR purview in 1998, the DoD’s 
ability to launch satellites from a foreign launch system 
has been expressly prohibited unless the President testifies 
before Congress that it is a matter of national security.130  
While these measures were primarily designed to protect the 
sensitive nature of systems developed for national security 
reasons, many believe that the regulatory system, which was 
developed during the Cold War, needs to be revamped to 
reflect the realities of the twenty-first century.   
The debate, as to whether the existing export control 
system needs to be overhauled, is ongoing.  In August of 
2009, President Obama commissioned a review to examine the 
merits of the current export control regime, in particular, 
the complicated and overly restrictive nature of ITAR.131  
The Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, went on record to 
state that as it pertains to ITAR, “stringent is not the 
same as effective,” citing that the United States has one of 
the most stringent export control systems in the world. 
Rather than protecting the United States and its interests, 
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however, it is creating an environment that is difficult to 
enforce, and is eroding the commercial opportunities of the 
defense industrial base.132  The national security reasons 
as to why the current export control system needs to be 
overhauled was nicely summarized by Secretary Gates when he 
stated, “The current export-control regime impedes the 
effectiveness of our closet military allies, tests their 
patience and goodwill, and hinders their ability to 
coordinate with U.S. forces.”133   
B. ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM THROUGH GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES 
While the DoD’s procurement strategy is touted as being 
guided by policy and legislation aimed at bolstering 
America’s national security interests, one cannot help but 
question whether the measures taken are based on economic or 
security reasons.  As already established, the CSLA 
established the legal framework for how the American space 
launch industry interacted with both the DoD and commercial 
customers to promote the American industrial base.  
Consequently, the 1989 U.S. National Space Policy focused on 
growing the commercial industry based on free and open 
market principles.  In fact, the 1989 U.S. National Space 
Policy explicitly stated, “The United States will, as a 
matter of policy, pursue its commercial space objectives 
without the use of direct Federal subsidies.”134  The key 
point to recognize is twofold.  First, the 1989 U.S. 
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National Space Policy alludes to withholding only “direct” 
subsidies and, second, that this language disappeared from 
any and all subsequent U.S. Space Policy documents issued 
since 1989. 
Since the early 1990s, the United States has appeared 
to skirt its policy of not providing direct subsidies to the 
space launch industry and, instead, providing indirect 
subsidies through military support and exclusive procurement 
contracts.135  Through indirect subsidies, the DoD is 
transferring knowledge, technology, research, development 
capital, and critical infrastructure items by means of DoD-
funded procurement activities.  In fact, every country 
involved in space launch during this period received some 
form of government subsidies, which only further blurred the 
boundaries of the proper use of government subsidies.136   
If the government were not involved in providing key 
resources and capital to the space launch industry, much of 
the competitive advantages American corporations have in the 
international marketplace may not exist.  Several critics 
assert that the government actively pursues the practice of 
subsidizing the defense industrial base using DoD contracts, 
in an effort to ensure American maintains its superiority in 
the sector.137  Yet the executive branch continually 
underscores the significance of needing to support the 
industry for both national security and economic reasons.138   
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Throughout the economic and fiscal policy realm, there 
is a general understanding of how and when governments 
should subsidize an industry.  Commonly accepted economic 
theory states that government subsidies generally should 
fall into one of four categories: offsetting various market 
imperfections, exploiting economies of scale in production, 
meeting social policy objectives (including the protection 
of the defense industrial base), and changing the 
distribution of income and increasing or retaining 
employment.139  From this perspective, subsidies should be 
used either to redistribute equity to the populace, or to 
help correct some shortcomings in achieving a comparative 
advantage in the global marketplace.140  One of the reasons 
leading to the creation of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) was an effort to regulate international trade, and it 
has endeavored to define a subsidy as “a financial 
contribution, by a government or public body within the 
state, and which confers a benefit.”141  However, 
governments frequently provide subsidies indirectly through 
military and civilian procurement contracts that go against 
the notion of a free market society.  Notwithstanding, this 
form of aid is seen throughout highly technical industries 
that are considered a national interest by their respective 
governments. These governments, therefore, employ fiscal 
policy to create advantages in the market place through 
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conscious government actions, in effect creating a 
competitive advantage rather than relying on the free market 
system to gain a comparative advantage.142  It could, 
therefore, be inferred that the use of government contracts 
to provide industries with money might also be viewed as 
another recognized subsidy source.   
Additionally, it is evident that most industrialized 
nations not only provide direct, but indirect subsidies to 
companies and industries through military and civil 
institutions by means such as research and development (R&D) 
initiatives, as well as procurement contracts.143  This 
effort is considered acceptable because it is viewed as a 
social good through which the entire nation benefits. The 
overt government investment through R&D subsidies has proven 
to generate high rates of return and produce an overall 
long-term benefit to the nation, thereby expanding the role 
the government has played to promote innovation over the 
past three decades.144  Unfortunately, this form of aid 
could be viewed as distorting the true nature of why 
subsidies are provided in the first place, blurring the role 
governments should play in where and when to intervene in 
the marketplace—not to mention how the use of government 
subsidies affect the profitability of corporations who win 
these government contracts. 
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While it is clear that there are numerous advantages to 
the U.S. government subsidizing the space launch industry, 
it can also be viewed as a crutch.  If the industry has 
indeed become reliant on the government to provide it with 
the necessary funding to conduct R&D and its basic 
operational expenses, then the government is weakening the 
domestic industry’s ability to compete in the global market, 
let alone to stay in business.  If the space launch industry 
is becoming overly reliant on the U.S. government, then the 
very policies and practices we are employing to bolster our 
national security and access to space is actually having the 
opposite effect.   
The controversy over the national security implication 
of promoting and fostering an industry out of protectionist 
ambitions is not new.  For years, economists and strategists 
have studied this very issue in an effort to determine the 
proper mix of domestic versus foreign reliance in critical 
areas of defense.145  Should the DoD and federal government 
develop and foster an industry that it supports with the 
state’s resources and controls with legal regulations, and 
then require that domestic and public entities use the 
service exclusively?  A review conducted by Theodore Moran 
analyzed the competition that took place during the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) competition for a new 
airborne warning system between Boeing’s Airborne Warning 
and Control System (AWACS) and the British Nimrod Airborne 
Early Warning system in the late 1970s. The results 
illustrate the risk of relying on a “purely state system” 
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verses developing a system that was born from an 
international consortium.146  The Nimrod was considered by 
many to be a superior system compared to the Boeing AWACS, 
but lost the contract because of its inability to 
incorporate multinational requirements and assistance 
necessary to adapt to a dynamically changing environment, 
thereby creating a situation that resulted in numerous 
delays and uncontrollable cost escalations.147  This 
situation, while not exactly the same as what is transpiring 
with the American space launch industry, does have many 
similarities.  It indicates how protectionist policies 
intended to create a “nationalized” product for national 
security reasons can, in the end fail, if it is unable to 
adapt to the changing environment.   
A review of the use of government subsidies in the 
space launch market thus concluded that the use of the DoD 
as a tool to achieve economic goals would ultimately be a 
mistake, which would encourage the commercial defense 
industrial base to focus more on winning DoD contracts, 
while neglecting its commercial focus.148  Unfortunately, 
the idea that this could happen in the space launch industry 
is not foreign.  In fact, in the early days of the Titan 
launch system, Martin Marietta opted out of the commercial 
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launch market to pursue DoD contracts exclusively, a trend 
that appears to be reemerging with the EELV program.149 
C. NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS 
In May of 2010, the Obama administration released an 
updated version of America’s National Security Strategy 
(NSS).  The 2010 NSS is a departure from the 2002 NSS, 
outlining a more strategic approach to achieving national 
security, which is supported heavily with calls for 
international cooperation to bolster America’s security, 
prosperity, values, and international stability.150  The NSS 
recognizes that the value of maintaining America’s access to 
space is not only that it will enhance our national 
security, but also that it is a key component of America’s 
prosperity, as well as acting as a “catalyst for 
innovation.”151  This fact has led many experts to argue 
that maintaining America’s access to space is critical to 
preserving its role as a leader in global commerce, 
scientific advancement, and military dominance.152  
Therefore, to achieve the goals set forth in the NSS, the 
government and industry need to find a balancing point 
between a state-run program and one that continues to 
operate within the free market society and is not dependant 
on DoD subsidies.  
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The belief that America must assure its continued 
unfettered access to space is not in question.  What is in 
question is why current policies mandate that the DoD must 
maintain a domestic launch capability and that it cannot use 
foreign suppliers to meet the department’s requirements.  
The NSS and the U.S. National Space Policy make note that it 
is in the interest of “national security” that the DoD must 
preserve and maintain this capability.  However, the 
approach to nationalize the American space launch industry 
appears to be producing numerous unintended consequences, 
the least of which is the declining dominance of American 
satellite and space launch systems in the global market.  
Many proponents with the industry believe that the 
restrictive rules and regulations placed on the industry by 
the federal government is a leading cause of the industry’s 
decline in the global marketplace.153 
A report recently issued by the Center for Strategic 
and Internal Studies examined the “militarization” of the 
domestic space launch industry by the DoD and its effects on 
America’s national security.154  The report reinforced that 
America’s access to, and the use of, space was critical for 
our national security and that the DoD’s role in maintaining 
it had become a critical factor that linked commercial, 
civil, and intelligence agencies together. 
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Figure 11.  Interconnectedness of Space Launch155 
The report went on to recognize that the DoD’s assured 
access to space requirement is currently being fulfilled by 
ULA and that the DoD was quickly becoming its dominant 
customer.156  As such, the DoD also dominated the space 
launch manifest, thereby creating a lack of availability to 
launch anything other than DoD satellites, which in and of 
itself is depressing the domestic launch market even 
further.157  This disparity is further exacerbated by the 
fact that, similar to the DoD, domestically produced 
satellites cannot be launched from foreign systems without 
express approval from the Department of State and Department 
of Commerce as part of the ITAR process to protect potential 
dual technologies.  These policies and practices have 
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resulted in a depressed commercial market, which is forcing 
the DoD to subsidize the domestic space launch market more 
than ever to make up for lost commercial business. 
Based on the facts concerning the state of the domestic 
launch market, the national security concerns centering 
around the DoD’s use of domestic space launch providers is 
somewhat at odds with itself.  The 2010 NSS seeks to promote 
national security through bolstering American’s security 
while invigorating the economy.  In regards to space and 
space-related matters, at appears that the NSS is 
promulgating a strategy that may be bolstering the DoD’s 
ability to maintain its access to space for national 
security means; unfortunately, it is also suffocating the 
very industry that is providing the DoD with the capability 
to do so. In the end, this may ultimately affect the DoD’s 
ability to maintain its current access to space methodology. 
D. CONCLUSION  
To determine whether the DoD is effectively achieving 
the government’s mandate, as set forth in the 2010 National 
Space Policy to “provide reliable, affordable, and timely 
space access,” this chapter presented several issues 
prevalent in the current space launch environment.158  The 
primary issue centered on the examination of three 
contributing factors: ineffective export control 
regulations, the use of protectionist policies and 
government subsidies, and a National Security Strategy that 
creates conflict between maintaining security and economic 
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prosperity.  While not directly influencing the DoDs ability 
to access space, these three factors do affect the manner in 
which the DoD must go about achieving it, which subsequently 
affects the defense industrial base’s ability to deliver and 
maintain this capability for the nation as a whole. 
When examining the DoD’s ability to continue its 
current strategy to access space, one simply cannot look at 
the policies and practices employed by the DoD.  In effect, 
several policies and regulations designed to protect 
America’s national security, are having several unintended 
consequences.  Regulations such as the outdated export 
controls and ITAR, originally intended to protect sensitive 
American technology, have turned into an ineffectual set of 
policies; rather than protecting the American defense 
industrial base, they have begun to stifle its ability to 
compete and survive without the assistance of the DoD.  
Forcing many high-ranking officials in the government to 
call for a review of these outdated regulations and replace 
it with a system that is more in line with today’s 
requirements. 
The primary reason the current policies and regulations 
surrounding America’s space launch industry need to be 
revamped is that the DoD cannot continue to subsidize the 
space launch industry as it has over the past decade.  The 
nation has seen an industry that began as a public venture 
turned commercial and has begun slowly returning to a DoD 
financed industry.  The methodology of using indirect 
subsidies to maintain the industry has many critics in the 
field arguing that this form of “economic protectionism” is, 
in effect, weakening America’s capability rather than 
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enhancing it.  In addition, the space launch industry’s 
dependency on subsidies is developing an industry that is 
more focused on meeting the needs of the DoD rather than 
being able to effectively compete within the domestic and 
international markets, thus creating a cycle of dependency 
and disequilibrium within the market.  More importantly, the 
focus on meeting the requirements of the DoD has resulted in 
an inability of commercial customers to launch their 
satellites when they need to.  This policy creates schedule 
delays that result in lost revenue for American satellite 
manufacturers, prompting many of them to seek permission to 
launch abroad rather than domestically.  This cycle 
culminates in the DoD paying a higher allocation of the 
associated costs required to preserve the space launch 
infrastructure. 
In summary, these regulatory and fiscal policy 
measures, which were originally designed to protect 
America’s national security, appear to be having the 
opposite effect.  The current export control laws have 
devolved into a series of protectionist policies designed to 
enhance the DoD’s ability to access to space while 
simultaneously stimulating the economy.  Unfortunately, the 
policies seem to be at odds with each other, creating a 
paradox between maintaining our military capability and 
preserving America’s economic stability.  This situation has 
manifested from a commercially driven free market concept 
into a government-supported infrastructure, which has forced 
the DoD to subsidize a greater of the space launch 
infrastructure.  The question remains: If the DoD cannot 
continue to subsidize the increasing cost of the domestic  
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space launch infrastructure, who will pick up the bill, and 
can it survive within the new global space launch market 
without the DoD? 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The research presented in this thesis addresses the 
affectivity and efficiency of the DoDs current space launch 
strategy as a means to guarantee the department’s access to 
space.  The policies established by the U.S. government were 
designed to enhance our national security through preserving 
the DoD’s ability to access space, while ensuring that the 
United States maintains the domestic capability to do so 
independently.  This involves establishing and mandating a 
series of regulations and policies that the DoD and the 
defense industrial base must follow, irrespective of the 
long–term impact.  
This situation, coupled with a weak demand for space 
launch services, has created an American space launch 
industry that is almost completely dependent on the United 
States government to support it through indirect subsidies 
from the DoD.  Unfortunately, the solution the DoD and the 
commercial industry created is plagued with personnel and 
programmatic issues.  Over the past decade, these issues 
have manifested into a series of uncontrolled cost 
escalations and the inability of the DoD or ULA to provide 
accurate cost forecasts for what it will take to continue 
and fund the program into the future.   
The situation is further complicated by the fact that 
the DoD is required by law to use and maintain American-
based firms to meet its space launch requirements.  
Unfortunately, the cost for the DoD to follow this guidance 
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is becoming increasingly more expensive, outpacing the DoD’s 
target growth rate of 3 percent by more than a factor of 
four.  However, there are numerous international consortiums 
that offer space launch services to commercial and 
government customers at a fraction of what the DoD is 
currently paying to maintain ULA’s capability.  
Unfortunately, the DoD is prohibited from exploring these 
alternatives out of what appears to be a series of 
protectionist regulations aimed at preserving the defense 
industrial base, rather than enabling the DoD to achieve its 
goal of providing reliable and efficient access to space in 
the most fiscally responsible manner.  The question that 
remains unanswered is: How long can the U.S. government and 
the DoD continue to employ a strategy that does not seek to 
optimize its efforts to assure the DoD’s access to space?  
It appears that the DoD and government policy makers have 
created a situation in which they have no choice but to 
continue to subsidize the domestic space launch industry, 
due to the likelihood that, if they do not, the industry may 
fail altogether.     
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Domestic and Foreign Space Launch Providers as 
Partners, Not Competitors 
Since the turn of the century, the United States and 
the DoD have come to realize the importance of international 
collaboration to achieve our nation’s goals. The acceptance 
of this new reality is prevalent in nearly every facet of 
the 2010 U.S. National Space Policy except one: assuring 
access to space for the Department of Defense.  The 2010 
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policy takes bold steps to outline how important 
international collaboration is to achieve the goals set 
forth in the policy, yet it is explicit in stating that the 
only way to enhance the United States’ assured access to 
space capabilities is to continue to pursue it 
independently, rather than incorporate international 
cooperation.  
The realities of the twenty–first century and the 
lessons learned over the past decade must be applied to how 
our nation fights wars, as well as how the DoD delivers the 
tools and capabilities to effectively do so.  The DoD needs 
to optimize how it goes about defending our nation in the 
most efficient manner possible.  One such solution is to 
form partnerships with America’s economic and military 
allies to create a more robust and resilient space launch 
capability.  The use of multiple providers to achieve the 
DoD’s access to space can effectively broaden the DoD’s 
capability, flexibility, and interoperability, while 
eliminating a potential single-source failure and reduce the 
overall cost.  The amount of international collaboration the 
DoD enters into is dependent on balancing the national 
security requirement to maintain a domestic capability with 
fostering and strengthening international ties with key 
allies.   As technology advances and the associated cost 
burdens continue to increase, the DoD cannot afford to 
continue to isolate itself from its allies and international 
partners.  The time is right to begin embracing a new 
strategy of international cooperation to assure the DoD 
access to space. 
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2. The Need for a Transformational Mindset and the 
Realities of the Domestic Space Launch Industry 
When the Commercial Space Launch Act was signed into 
law in 1988, the government tried to expand its capability 
to access space, from what was a purely government function 
to a commercially driven industry.  Now, in an era when the 
defense industrial base can no longer maintain this 
capability without significant government subsidies, the DoD 
is faced with the fact that certain steps must be taken to 
preserve this capability.  The question is: Should the 
United States continue to invest billions of dollars into 
the domestic space launch market, or should it seek to 
embrace a new mindset through the adoption of a new assured 
access to space strategy?  The reality is that the current 
solution employed by the DoD, while technologically 
achievable, has been plagued by unstable cost increases 
since the program’s inception.  These costs have increased 
at a rate of nearly 16.2 percent per year for the past 
decade, making it the fastest-growing procurement activity 
within the DoD.  
The current strategy to maintain the DoD’s access to 
space is built on the premise that it is in the nation’s 
best interest to preserve our current space launch 
capability for national security reasons.   However, the 
regulations and policies set forth to codify this position 
appear to be based more on preserving our capability from an 
economic rather than a national security standpoint.  In 
August of 2009, the President directed that many of the 
regulations and policies governing export control and the 
governance of dual–use technology be reviewed to determine 
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if they warrant being modified to reflect the current 
national security environment.  The time is ripe to 
modernize the regulations and policies that govern America’s 
assured access to space.  Many of the ineffective and 
outdated export control regulations and guidelines are 
restricting the DoD from implementing a strategy that is 
potentially not only more effective, but efficient as well.   
The commercialization of the national space launch 
industry in 1988 was driven by the need to create redundancy 
within the industry and eliminate the monopoly held by the 
government.  Unfortunately, the policy makers failed to 
learn from the lessons of the past.  The development of the 
EELV program and the 2005 merger of The Boeing Company and 
Lockheed Martin Corporation into one joint venture have 
returned the DoD to a state of relying on a single provider 
to meet its access to space requirements once again.  Unless 
the government takes steps to diversify and expand the 
options available for use by the DoD, the nation is one 
accident away from potentially losing its ability to access 
space when required.  If history has taught us anything, it 
is that the DoD cannot afford to lose its ability to access 
space as it did after the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded 
in 1986, which was a tragic event that resulted in the 
inability of the DoD to launch any military satellites for 
almost three years. 
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